



# **Education in Fragile Situations: A Review of Political Economy and Conflict Analysis Literature and Tools**

**Erika Boak  
CfBT Education Trust**

**March 2011**

## Acknowledgements

This report has benefited greatly from the technical support and advice of the European Commission (EC) Advisory Group set up for the project, *Guidance on Political Economy Analysis in the Education Sector in Fragile Situations*, of which this Literature and Tools Review is the first output. The Advisory Group is made up of Emily Oldmeadow, Pierre Andriamampianina, Begoña Bravo Hevia and Corrado Scognamillo.

The following colleagues are also acknowledged for their thoughtful contributions, Janice Dolan, CfBT Education Trust, Alan Smith, University of Ulster and Peter Buckland, Independent Consultant.

## Table of Contents

1. Introduction	6
1.1 Evolution of the Approaches to Governance, Political Economy Analysis and Conflict Analysis	7
2. Methodology	8
3. Review of the Literature and Tools on Political Economy and Conflict Analysis	8
3.1 Review of the Tools and Approaches for Political Economy Analysis	8
3.1.1 Review of the Tools and Approaches at Country-level	8
3.1.2 Review of the Tools and Approaches at Sector-level	12
3.1.3 Review of the Tools and Approaches at Issue-level	15
3.2 Review of the Tools and Approaches for Conflict Analysis	15
3.2.1 Review of the Tools and Approaches at Country-level	16
3.2.2 Review of the Tools and Approaches at Sector-level	18
4. Conclusions and Implications	21
4.1 Implications for Phase 2	22
References	25
Appendices	
Appendix 1	Evolution of Approaches to Governance, Political Economy Analysis and Conflict Analysis
Appendix 2	Drivers of Change and Political Economy How to Note, DFID
Appendix 3	Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Appendix 4	Analytical Framework for Understanding the Political Economy of Sectors and Policy Arenas, ODI
Appendix 5	The Political Economy of Policy Reform, the World Bank
Appendix 6	Support to Sector Programmes and Analysing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations, EC
Appendix 7	Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis, World Bank

Appendix 8	OECD Questions to Pose of Conflict Analysis Tools
Appendix 9	Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes, DFID
Appendix 10	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, US Government
Appendix 11	The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict, UNICEF
Appendix 12	Education and Fragility Assessment Tool, USAID
Appendix 13	Analytical Framework of Education and Fragility, INEE

  

Figure 1	Framework for DOC
Figure 2	Analytical Framework for Understanding the Political Economy of Sectors and Policy Arenas
Figure 3	Intra-sector Analysis of Organisations in a Sector
Figure 4	How Players Influence the Policy-making Process: Basic Issues for Analysis
Figure 5	Conceptual Framework of the Political Economy of Reform
Figure 6	Matrix of Sector Reform against Political Economy Management Criteria
Figure 7	Elements of a Sector Programme
Figure 8	EC Governance Analysis Framework
Figure 9	Three Layers of Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis
Figure 10	The Three Key Stages of Conflict Assessment
Figure 11	Evaluation of the Context of the Conflict
Figure 12	Headings of Education and Fragility Assessment Tool

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

DFID	Department for International Development
DOC	Drivers of Change
EC	European Commission
EFA FTI	Education for All Fast Track Initiative
EU	European Union
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
SCAGA	Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPSP	Sector Policy Support Programme
UN	United Nations

# Education in Fragile Situations: A Review of Political Economy and Conflict Analysis Literature and Tools

---

## 1. Introduction

The literature review is the first output of phase 1 of the EC project *Guidance on Political Economy Analysis<sup>1</sup> in the Education Sector in Fragile Situations*. The objective of the project is to enhance the effectiveness of EC education aid, particularly in fragile situations. Its purpose is to adapt, apply and share practical experiences of political economy analysis in the education sector, particularly in fragile situations. The project is being implemented by CfBT Education Trust. It follows on from a global study made up of eight country case studies conducted in 2009 regarding the Governance Challenges in Education in Fragile Situations.

This project is one of several work streams currently underway in the EC related to political economy analysis. The EC guidance on project and programme cycle management is currently being revised in order to harmonise guidelines and also to ensure that a political economy approach is integrated throughout. In addition, the EC's (2008a) *Analysing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations* is currently being tested in various sectors and countries with a view to strengthening it. This project is engaging with these work streams in order to ensure maximum relevance for the EC and European Union (EU) Delegations.

The literature review seeks to outline key developments, methodological tools and analytical frameworks in the areas of: i.) governance; ii.) political economy; and iii.) conflict analysis, particularly in relation to the education sector in fragile situations. The review seeks to summarise what is known and what is not known in the fields of political economy analysis and conflict analysis. Where appropriate, recommendations will be made on the most appropriate tools to use in the next phase of this project. If, however, there are a lack of tools, the research gaps identified will inform the development of adapted approaches which could be used during the implementation phase.

Section 2 explains the methodology used in the literature review. Section 3 sets out the key trends in the fields of political economy and conflict analysis respectively at country, sector and issue-levels. This section draws on a range of literature as well as tools and approaches developed by donors and other organisations. Section 4 presents the conclusions and identifies the critical gaps in the literature on political economy analysis and makes recommendations on how to address these. It also discusses the implications for phase 2 of the project. The Appendices are a toolbox of the key methodologies and approaches related to political economy and conflict analysis which are referred to and analysed in Section 3.

---

<sup>1</sup> OECD DAC has defined 'political economy analysis' as relating to *the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time.*

## **1.1 Evolution of the Approaches to Governance, Political Economy Analysis and Conflict Analysis**

Over the past 15 years, donors have been moving upstream in their approach to supporting partner governments placing attention on institutions and more recently politics (Warrener, 2004; Hazenberg, 2009). This has resulted in a 'legitimate' focus on the quality of countries' macro and sector-level governance as well as the political processes which inform decision-making (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), 2006). Initially the governance agenda sought to address the gap between the desired governance situation and the current situation and the steps needed to reach the governance 'ideal'. This was criticised as a normative approach, closely linked to conditionality. The good enough governance approach was developed underlining priorities and feasible, discrete governance improvements over the long-term, which were relevant to the local context, rather than a prescriptive list of initiatives (Grindle, 2005).

Nevertheless, donor support to governance over the past decades has yielded disappointing results and human development outcomes (Fritz, Kaiser and Levy, 2009). There has been a recognition that technical solutions are not appropriate for political problems. Indeed, donors have often blamed aid ineffectiveness on the absence of political will in the partner country. The term has been used liberally without sufficient analysis of the deep-seated causes of the resistance to reforms on the part of governments (Booth, Crook, Gyimah-Boadi, Killick, Luckham and Boateng, 2005). Political economy analysis helps to address this gap by investigating the norms which shape people's behaviour as well as the formal and hidden incentives and power dynamics within and between groups and institutions which influence how decisions are made. Political economy approaches started to inform donor planning cycles in the early 2000s pioneered by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The analysis goes deeper than routine governance assessments as it incorporates historical, social and cultural trends, identifying their legacies on existing dynamics. As a result, development assistance can be designed in the grain of the overriding political incentives and the country's development trajectory.

The discipline of conflict analysis gained significant ground in development circles in the late 1990s and early 2000s influenced by the 'do no harm' approach. It was also prompted by the need to learn difficult lessons regarding mistakes made by the international community in Somalia and Rwanda during the 1990s where humanitarian assistance had actually served to stoke the conflicts (Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001; Aide à la Décision Economique (ADE), 2010). Moreover, conflicts in West Africa's Mano River region as well as the Great Lakes showed the importance of analysing conflicts within the context of the broader region as well as the role of illegal trade (ADE, 2010). Design of donor initiatives which is not sensitive to the conflict can result in marginalisation of certain groups, exacerbate underlying causes of poverty and incite a return to conflict or alternatively provoke its onset. Further information on the evolution of the three approaches can be found in Appendix 1.

## 2. Methodology

A broad range of literature relating to governance, political economy and conflict analysis was reviewed. A small selection of political economy and conflict analysis tools and publications was identified for analysis in order to keep the scope of the literature review manageable and accessible to readers. These tools were selected based on the extent to which they were referenced in the literature as being influential. They were also selected on the basis that they provided sufficiently distinct approaches to political economy and conflict analysis to allow them to be contrasted and reviewed. As a result, the approaches employed by other donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Irish Aid and the *Agence Française de Développement*, to name a few, have not been reviewed.

It is important to note that systematic reviews of the majority of the tools have not been conducted in relation to their use and impact (OECD, 2008a), therefore this report has reviewed literature *about* the tools as well as reports written *using* the tool to analyse the national context, particular sectors or issues in different countries. The selected tools and publications were contrasted and overarching themes and trends identified. The appendices include a brief description of each of the tools or approaches analysed including details of where they can be found on the Internet.

## 3. Review of the Literature and Tools on Political Economy and Conflict Analysis

Over the past 10 years there has been a substantial increase in the tools and guidelines developed by donor agencies and other organisations in relation to governance, political economy analysis and conflict analysis. Many of the tools build upon each other and are underpinned by the same assumptions and hypotheses. Appendix 1 has a brief overview of the evolution of the approaches to the three areas and reveal that both policy economy and conflict analysis have a common origin in the DFID Drivers of Change (DOC) approach. This section compares and analyses a selection of the key tools and approaches for political economy and conflict analysis according to their targeted level of analysis, in other words country-level, sector-level or issue-level.

### 3.1 Review of the Tools and Approaches for Political Economy Analysis

#### 3.1.1 Review of the Tools and Approaches at Country-level

The majority of the tools developed by donors on political economy have focused on the country or macro-level. It is broadly recognised that the macro-level should serve as the starting point from which to go into more detailed analysis at thematic, sectoral or issue levels due to the need to understand the context deeply. This section reviews the approaches of the British and Dutch Governments, the World Bank, the EC and other relevant literature. The World Bank's approach will also be analysed under *3.1.3 Review of the Tools and Approaches at Issue-level*.

## **Approaches to Political Economy Analysis**

Much of the literature and many of the tools frame their approach around concepts of neo-patrimonialism and patronage (EC, 2005; EC, 2008a; Fritz et al., 2009).<sup>2</sup> The EC (2005) points out that where states are weak and lack legitimacy they are forced to provide favours to strong interest groups in order to preserve their power base. In these contexts, formal and informal institutions are not only distinct but sometimes at odds with each other and informal rules of games subvert formal ones. Formal institutions are therefore purely façades masking the reality of the dealings behind them. The relationship between formal and informal institutions is particularly important since it often influences policy and implementation choices (Fritz et al., 2009). DOC study in Ghana identified: “an enduring neopatrimonialism... in which horizontal interest-groups are subordinated to vertical patronage relationships” (Booth et al., 2005: 1).

The recognition that countries’ starting places, values and norms may be fundamentally different to those of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries has also prompted a realisation that their trajectories towards growth and development will likewise be different (Institute of Development Studies (IDS), 2010). As a result, there is broad agreement on the need to understand the local situation as defined by the national and regional contexts, rather than against a Western ideal. This has led to a reduced use of normative blueprints and prescriptive approaches in favour of more diagnostic tools and processes (Warrener, 2004; EC, 2005; Unsworth and Conflict Research Unit, 2007; Fritz et al., 2009). Having said this, an OECD-commissioned survey of donor governance assessments revealed that donors’ approaches have mainly been developed in response to discrete agency needs rather than national governance processes or local-level demand (OECD, 2008a).

DFID was the first donor to develop a framework for analysing political economy at the country level through DOC. Details can be found in Appendix 2. DOC was developed due to the need to understand the fundamental political processes which influence pro-poor change (DFID, 2004). DFID perceived DOC to be an approach rather than simply a tool owing to the ensuing implications for the way DFID planned and delivered aid (Warrener, 2004). The Dutch Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SCAGA) framework (please refer to Appendix 3) was subsequently developed and drew strongly on the design of DOC as well as Sida’s Power Analysis approach. SCAGA was designed in order to allow a more strategic study of the broad national contexts of governance and anti-corruption (Unsworth and Conflict Research Unit, 2007). Both DOC and SCAGA highlight the importance of the underlying, informal drivers of political behaviour and their links to the governance of the country.

Building on the experience of DFID and SCAGA, the EC is currently reviewing its own guidance. Political economy approaches will be integrated into its country-level analysis in order to feed into the preparation of its Country Strategy Papers. Initial guidelines have been drafted, based on an evolution of the SCAGA approach. These will be tested during 2011 and 2012 and as a result were not available to be reviewed in this report.

---

<sup>2</sup> It is recognised that patronage networks have not undermined growth in Asia in the way that they have in Sub-Saharan Africa.

### **Methodology of Political Economy Analysis**

It is acknowledged that the timing of the conduct of political economy analysis is key in order to ensure operational relevance. It must be planned at appropriate times to allow the integration of findings into plans and strategies, rather than when major funding decisions have already been taken (DFID, 2009a).

The tools on governance and political economy analysis draw heavily on perception-based data (OECD, 2008a) and owing to the sensitivity of the data collected, the World Bank (Fritz et al., 2009) and DFID (2009a) emphasise the importance of triangulation during the data collection and analysis phase in order to corroborate statements made. It is acknowledged however that this is more challenging for sector-level analysis owing to the lack of grey or published material. The literature also underlines that political economy analysis, by its nature, involves discussions with a wider range of actors than would traditionally be the case due to the need to canvass the opinions of hidden groups (Sida, 2006). The World Bank highlights that it is important to ensure feedback from country stakeholders in order to validate the findings and to start the process of developing their operational implications (Fritz et al., 2009), indeed the SCAGA framework includes formal provision of a workshop to develop the donor strategy to address the issues uncovered.

The literature suggests there are two approaches to political economy analysis, one that formally involves the partner government and the other which does not. It is recognised that the methodology should be adapted according to the approach chosen. Nevertheless, an open approach regarding the rationale for the work is generally recommended (EC, 2008a). This is likely to be particularly challenging in fragile situations due to the heightened political sensitivities. As a result, the feasibility of working with the partner government needs to be considered carefully at the outset. It is also possible to conduct joint political economy analysis with other development partners in order to generate a shared analysis, feeding into collaborative decision-making.

The literature is almost unanimous in stating the importance of involving strong local consultants or local staff during the field research through to dissemination of findings. Local staff are invaluable in accessing and interpreting relevant data and advising on the most appropriate process and informants to be interviewed (Warrener, 2004; Fritz et al., 2009). Dissemination of the report needs to be planned carefully in advance and according to the level of sensitivity of the report. Certain donors recommend sharing as much information as possible in order to facilitate a common understanding of the local situation thus strengthening the policy dialogue, however it is acknowledged that sensitive data are unlikely to be circulated beyond a closed circle of recipients (EC, 2008a).

### **Outcomes of Political Economy Analysis**

The literature published towards the end of the 2000s has focused to a greater extent on the opportunities and solutions which the political economy presents rather than purely identifying obstacles and constraints to reform programmes and broader development (Fritz et al., 2009; IDS, 2010). The 'first generation' of political economy studies highlighted the reasons why donor-supported public sector reform programmes had failed (Sida, 2006). Moreover, despite the fact that studies may have been commissioned by donors who typically support social sectors, many of the findings of political economy studies have focused on the link between politics and commercial interests with limited attention on some of the key sectors which donors support (Booth et al., 2005; Utomi, Duncan and Williams, 2007).

A recurring theme throughout much of the literature is a warning to policy-makers and practitioners against overly high expectations of the outcomes of political economy analysis. The analysis should primarily bring a greater realism and pragmatism to donor support and in some cases a lower level of ambition for the changes envisaged (Hazenberg, 2009). Indeed, some of the literature has identified an emerging tension between headquarter-imposed pressure on donors to generate and demonstrate tangible results in the short-term, and the revelation (through political economy studies) of the multiple constraints on development and growth and the complexity of formal and informal institutions (Warrener, 2004; OECD, 2008a). Pressure on donors to make large funding commitments may fly in the face of political economy findings urging caution. Indeed, political economy analysis may result in the design of less ambitious programmes with longer timeframes and in the grain of long-term key trends in the country (Sida, 2006).

There is broad consensus within the literature, particularly when political economy approaches were being piloted, that donors have struggled to define the operational implications and relevance of the findings of political economy analysis and to change their programming as a result (DFID, 2004; Warrener, 2004). Nevertheless, a clear outworking of political economy analysis is a heightened awareness of the risks incurred for donors in supporting particular programmes or reforms; this can inform options for mitigating the risks (Unsworth and Conflict Research Unit, 2007; Fritz et al., 2009). Political economy analysis can also help donors to analyse whether there is scope to expand the reform space (Fritz et al., 2009; DFID, 2009a). One of the recommendations which regularly emerges in political economy studies is for donors to increase their engagement with and support to civil society organisations in order to strengthen demand-side pressure and accountability (Booth et al., 2005; Sida, 2006; DFID, 2009a; Hazenberg, 2009).

#### **Positive Impacts of DFID DOC Studies**

Between 2003 and 2009, DFID conducted DOC studies in over 25 countries. As a result, DOC is the longest standing approach to political economy analysis and has had many tangible impacts. DOC country reports have:

- challenged assumptions behind programming;
- enabled the assessment of risks and development of mitigating strategies;
- increased awareness of the need for language to be neutral and less abstract fed into planning processes;
- strengthened the policy dialogue with partner governments and harmonisation with donors;
- revealed the need for collaboration with non-poor groups due to a broader perspective of change;
- resulted in a realisation of the need for longer timescales;
- contributed to deeper thinking on the meaning of pro-poor change;
- increased team-building and goal sharing amongst staff, building consensus on how change is viewed in-country;
- enhanced institutional memory by capturing knowledge of country staff; and
- facilitated inter-departmental working within the British Government; (Warrener, 2004; DFID, 2005).

Nevertheless, an early review of DOC, pointed out that many reports had focused on major issues, such as corruption or elite capture, which were already known. The reports had failed to identify underlying causes in relation to agents' motivations and details of their positive and negative incentives. As a result, recommendations regarding the real opportunities to drive change may have been limited and the impact on programming minimal (DFID, 2005).

While a systematic review of SCAGAs globally has not yet been conducted, findings from the studies have revealed the need to reduce donor ambitions due to the multifarious constraints on development. “Reality and modesty should become more important ingredients of bilateral aid policies, especially in those countries where there is a clear negative trend and development processes have stagnated for years” (Hazenberg, 2009: 408). It revealed that in some countries, the Embassies’ circle of interest was much bigger than their circle of influence. Hazenberg (2009) also argues that SCAGA leaves important information gaps in relation to national governance and the world behind the ‘façade’ of formal institutions, highlighting the need for additional research.

### **3.1.2 Review of the Tools and Approaches at Sector-level**

There has been a move away from conducting macro governance analyses which are parallel to technical analyses of particular issues or sectors. Instead, donors have sought to integrate governance and political economy approaches into sector-level assessments. An important feature in the design of sector-level analysis is the inclusion of a mixture of disciplinary expertise. A governance specialist or political analyst working in partnership with a sector specialist means that the analysis will not simply remain at the level of identifying technical challenges. Due to the strong current focus on sectoral aid, there is a new imperative for donors to understand the key opportunities and constraints within and across sectors. Nevertheless, there are still comparatively few sector-level political economy tools and no tools, specifically adapted for social sectors were identified. The tools that will be analysed in this section are those of ODI, the World Bank and the EC. Owing to the fact that very different approaches are employed, the tools will be analysed individually.

A 2009 ODI publication provides an overview of existing sector-level political economy approaches, frameworks and tools (Edelmann, 2009). It recognises, as the World Bank problem-based approach does, that in analysing the sector, it is necessary to understand the cross-sectoral (or government-wide) dynamics as well as the country-wide dynamics. It points out that sector-level political economy approaches seek to understand and “more effectively influence the political, economic and social structures, institutions, processes and actors determining the political dynamics of sector reforms” (Edelmann, 2009:7). Edelmann categorises sector-level analysis into six different types of approach set out in the box below.

#### **Sector-level Political Economy Approaches, Frameworks and Studies**

- Analysis of country-level context for sector reform;
- Analysis of sector characteristics, performance and challenges;
- Analysis of the policy content, consequences and political viability of proposed policies or policy changes;
- Analysis of the domestic policy-making and implementation process;
- Analysis of the key actors, interests and relationships between these actors; and
- Policy management and operational implications: assessment of possible entry points for donor support to sector reforms (Edelmann, 2009: 9).

Building on DOC, ODI developed an *Analytical Framework for Understanding the Political Economy of Sectors and Policy Arenas* to serve as a practical guide for DFID country offices in designing and conducting political economy analyses of sectors and of the policy arena (Moncrieffe and Luttrell, 2005). Please refer to Appendix 4 for details. Since this Framework is not presented in any subsequent DFID publication, it is unclear whether DFID has endorsed and used it as a sectoral and policy-level tool.

The approach focuses on the impact of underlying and long-term factors on the political and institutional environment, as well as incentives and capacity for reform. It also underlines that intra-sectoral analysis is pivotal in order to discover current and possible blockages as well as entry points for designing appropriate incentives. The first of the three stages of analysis draws strongly on DOC. Stage 2 includes a matrix for the *Intra-sectoral Analysis of Organisations in a Sector* which is similar to the Actor and Stakeholder Mapping tool in the EC's *Analysing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations* although the ODI framework includes a focus on historical legacies as well as ideologies, values and perceptions. The document also includes a framework for investigating how the players influence the policy-making process and the extent of responsiveness and accountability, which builds on its *Intra-sectoral Analysis of Organisations in a Sector*. This last framework is an important addition to the existing literature on political economy analysis at the sector level since it brings the essence of political economy thinking to the heart of the local policy-making process and broader accountability (see Appendix 4).

Whilst the overall ODI framework provides useful guidance on approaching political economy at the sector level and would lend itself easily to the education sector, it suffers from having too many tools within the framework. This makes it less user-friendly and may lead to compartmentalisation of the different stages of the analysis. The World Bank's (2008) study on the *Political Economy of Policy Reform* is based on experiences from agricultural marketing and water supply and sanitation. Details can be found in Appendix 5. It includes a focus on the inter-relationship and negotiations between stakeholders, institutions and processes and their influence on policy reform. Similar to Sida's power analysis, the study is premised on a power-based approach. This approach underlines the creation of winners and losers in any reform process and the dominating influence of interests over rational choices. Like the macro-level literature on political economy, the study underlines the importance of understanding the political context of policy reform, namely "how reforms get tabled and why; how they are perceived; and who will support, oppose or attempt to change the proposals..." (World Bank, 2008: vii). It also highlights the need to identify the overarching development trajectory of the sector in question.

The three key elements of the World Bank's *Conceptual Framework of the Political Economy of Sectoral Reform* – the reform context, the reform arena and the reform process – are similar to the building blocks of DOC. The reform context is comparable to DFID's structural features in relation to the historical impact of culture, politics and economics. Like ODI's Analytical Framework, it also identifies the sectoral links to national institutions and groups. The reform context also incorporates the stakeholders who are driving the reform agenda while DFID identifies agents separately from structural features. The Bank's reform arena relates to DFID's institutions, in other words the formal and informal rules governing relations but within the context of policy reform at the sectoral level. The reform process meanwhile is similar to the identification of the actual drivers of change in relation to coalition building or the dealings between stakeholders in the policy arena.

The EC's approach to planning at the sector level is directed by its guidelines on Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP) (EC, 2007) and therefore warrants analysis in this section. Please refer to Appendix 6. The guidelines are not however infused with the current thinking on political economy. Owing to the focus on government leadership, policy coherence and the budgeting process at sector and macro levels, there is a strong assumption in the guidelines that the EU will engage with formal institutions rather than informal ones. There is also an implicit assumption that the sector programme will support a comprehensive and rigorous reform, however the guidelines fail to equip EU personnel to engage in the political economy of the proposed reform. When discussing institutional change and organisational development, the influence of politics is not mentioned. Nevertheless, when assessing the applicability of a sector-wide approach, the guidelines state that EU personnel should verify that current incentives of government officials are compatible with the objectives of the approach. The incentives discussed however remain at the level of formal government incentives rather than hidden or informal ones.

The SPSP guidelines are complemented by a 2008 publication on *Analysing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations*. The EC interprets governance through three dimensions (EC, 2008a), please refer to Appendix 6 for details. There is a strong assumption throughout the guidance that improving sector governance will have a positive knock on effect on wider issues such as democracy and the rule of law. The extent to which this assumption is grounded in the latest evidence from political economy studies may be questioned.

The guidance acknowledges the need for organised analysis of the key governance issues in partner countries in relation to formal and informal rules, interests, power and resources in order to open up this 'black box'. It urges realism and patience in supporting long-term improvements. The guidance echoes some of the literature on political economy which advocates the need to exploit positive incentives for sector-level governance and performance improvements presented by regional or international trade, rather than purely in relation to aid.

It also advocates the need to take the current situation of the sector as the starting point rather than a 'governance ideal', analysing the historical and cultural influences underpinning the sector. Nevertheless, these issues are not reflected in its *Governance Analysis Framework* which is more in line with a traditional governance assessment, focusing on formal institutions and formal rules. An additional weakness of the Framework is the fact that non-state actors are in the centre of the diagram.

In Step 1 of the *Governance Analysis Framework*, the analysis remains at the level of formal institutions and formal capacity rather than the 'foundational factors', formal and hidden, which make up the context used by DFID and the Dutch Government. The framework to be used in Step 2 enables sector specialists to identify the interests and power of actors and stakeholders, however it is not possible to show how these interests impact upon sector performance, or to map them in order of their comparative and inter-linked weight in the sector.

The guidance has been tested by EU Delegations in various sectors and countries, such as trade in the Philippines and the water sector in Kenya. The report on Kenya's water sector identifies the overarching influence of patrimonial governance on all aspects of Kenyan life including the water sector and the existence of rampant and endemic tribalism, corruption and nepotism in the public and private sectors (Rampa, 2010). The report synthesises a lot of data regarding the competing public

and private interests in relation to water resource management and water services and the multifarious governance challenges in the sector including the absence of accountability or responsiveness to the voices of non-urban groups. Nevertheless, owing to the density of the data and the complexity of the sector, the relevance and implications of the findings for the EU are not always clear.

As stated earlier, the EC is revising its sector-level tools in order to integrate political economy approaches. This work will commence in March 2011 which is why the draft guidance has not been reviewed here.

### **3.1.3 Review of the Tools and Approaches at Issue-level**

This section will review a single World Bank tool.

The development of the World Bank's *Problem-driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis* in 2009 was informed by difficulties of using the findings of country- or sector-level political economy analysis in donor planning and programming. As a result, the Bank's approach takes the issue or challenge as the starting point in order to ensure operational relevance. Please refer to Appendix 7 for details. This represents an innovative way of approaching political economy and adds substantially to the literature. The publication acknowledges that while an issue or problem-driven approach can present a useful entry point to the sector or broader context, this does not negate the need for preliminary analysis at the macro- and sector-levels.

The Bank emphasises the importance of the relationship between formal and informal institutions owing to its influence on policy decisions or the implementation of policies. It identifies four different types of relationship: i.) complementary; ii.) accommodating; iii.) substituting; and iv.) competing or subverting (Fritz et al., 2009). It also highlights the need to analyse the interaction between structural, institutional and stakeholder variables and their impact on particular challenges. Meanwhile, the analysis of policy processes and their drivers can make the policy dialogue more focused in relation to the timing, mobilisation of actors and through the use of pragmatic arguments.

## **3.2 Review of the Tools and Approaches for Conflict Analysis**

This section will review the tools and approaches developed by various organisations and other relevant literature in relation to conflict analysis at the country-level and at the sector-level, with a focus on the education sector.

Donors have acknowledged the close relationship between conflict, peace, and development, and more recently state-building. They have increasingly recognised the need to conduct conflict analyses prior to designing support in fragile situations in order to ensure their support addresses the underlying causes of conflict and fragility rather than ignoring them or even exacerbating them (Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001). In the EC's *Communication on Conflict Prevention* (2001) for example, the EC committed itself to integrating conflict analysis into EU programming in conflict-affected countries, however it is not clear to what extent this has been followed owing to the absence of EC guidelines in this area. The first objective of DFID's (2010) approach to building peaceful states and societies is to address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms. Conflict-sensitive approaches seek to promote more robust analysis of the intended and unintended impact of interventions on conflict dynamics. This means understanding

“the history, the causes of conflict, the actors and relationships driving or mitigating conflict, and the dynamics between these different factors” (Center for Conflict Resolution, Rwenzori Development and Research Centre, Saferworld and Youth Development Organisation Arua, 2008: 1).

### **3.2.1 Review of the Tools and Approaches at Country-level**

In this section, a selection of donor tools will be reviewed, namely DFID’s Strategic Conflict Assessment and the US Government’s (2008) Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) as two distinct and robust approaches to conflict analysis as well as other relevant literature. It will also draw on selected political economy tools which include elements of conflict analysis. OECD (2008*b*) has developed a helpful checklist to help evaluators decide what tool or tools to use in conflict analysis, which can be found in Appendix 8. Like political economy analysis, conflict analysis is a comparatively new approach; tools have not been systematically tested and there is little evidence of their impact on conflict prevention and peace-building.

#### ***Approaches to Conflict Analysis***

Over the past decade, the fields of governance assessments and conflict analyses have merged due to the recognition that a fundamental cause of conflict is “weak governance institutions characterised by a lack of predictable and sustainable systems and by leaders who use public office to benefit themselves and their affiliates...[resulting in] divisive politics based on the monopolisation of power and the exclusion of major social and political groups” (United Nations, (UN) 2010: ix). Conflict analysis approaches have also drawn on the theoretical underpinnings of political economy analysis (DFID, 2002).

DFID draws a clear link between conflict and political economy analysis: “we must focus more than ever on building peaceful states and societies, working more politically to achieve that end... Conflict and fragility are inherently political. They are about how power and resources are shared in society, between ethnic groups, social classes or men and women. Their solutions must be rooted in politics (DFID, 2009*b*: 70). Indeed, there are many commonalities between conflict analysis and political economy analysis since in essence they share the same commitment to understanding the local context and its historical legacies in terms of embedded power relations.

The need for political sensitivity in order for development to be conflict-sensitive is echoed in other literature (Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001). Donors have also sought to mainstream conflict sensitivity and peace-building objectives into their programmes (ADE, 2010). Like political economy analysis, analysing conflicts requires broad participation in order to ensure relevance. Moreover, the literature warns against blueprint approaches to conflict analysis and recommends that the most relevant methodologies be adapted to the local context while keeping the targeted audience in mind (OECD DAC, 1997; Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001; ADE, 2010). The findings of conflict analysis have not always led to more informed decision-making due to the fact that the analysis has been overly academic (OECD DAC, 1997; Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001). The literature also points out the need to address entrenched structural inequalities requiring long term initiatives, while also responding to immediate needs. Moreover, this is a challenge which donors face in designing sector-specific support (Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001).

The literature asserts the need to leverage change and support peace-building through a wide variety of instruments, ensuring coherence between development aid, humanitarian relief, trade and investment policies (Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001; OECD DAC, 1997). The EU has made concerted efforts to improve consistency across these different areas. This concurs with the findings of political economy analysis which reveal that commercial interests and incentives can wield more influence over reform agendas than aid.

### ***Methodology of Conflict Analysis***

More recently, conflict analysis approaches and methodologies have been incorporated into political economy analyses conducted in fragile situations. The Dutch Government for example emphasises the need to support state-society interaction which could contribute to a more effective, legitimate and accountable state and warns against any action that might undermine this (Unsworth and Conflict Research Unit, 2007). SCAGA includes a small section on state fragility which points to the need to take particular account of the foundational factors (Unsworth and Conflict Research Unit, 2007). The World Bank advocates that country level analysis in conflict-affected countries should include a focus on the inter-ethnic or regional tensions (Fritz et al., 2009). DFID's Conflict Assessment Guidance Notes use a similar approach to DOC in highlighting the role of and interaction between structures and actors. Please refer to Appendix 9 for details.

Both the DFID approach to conflict analysis and that of the US Government (please refer to Appendix 10) focus on grievances as a source of instability. Both approaches seek to understand the context as well as the structural or institutional factors which impact on the conflict. The US approach however includes a focus on identifying local resilience. ICAF identifies social and institutional resilience as "the perception, by various groups in a society, that social relationships, structures or processes are in place and able to provide dispute resolution and meet basic needs through non-violent means" (US Government, 2008: 8).

Sida (2006) states that conflict analysis is broadly conducted when institutions are unable or unwilling to handle violent conflicts of interests in a peaceful way. It highlights that conflict analysis and power analysis are connected. Experience from Kenya however shows that while issues related to the conflict can be included in the power analysis, comprehensive conflict analyses are complex and need to be done separately.

### ***Outcomes of Conflict Analysis***

Despite progress in the field of conflict analysis donors have found it difficult to mainstream conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives within their programmes. This may partly be due to a lack of decentralised decision-making power at country level amongst donor agencies (Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001).

A Strategic Conflict Assessment commissioned by DFID in the Democratic Republic of Congo to analyse the relationship between aid and conflict recommended caution due to the interconnected nature of politics and the state: "Support for the state easily becomes support for a particular political position. This can fuel tensions and even violence. Too much aid can cause harm" (Vaux, Bewa and Sampson, 2007: 4).

As a result of a Strategic Conflict Analysis and Programme Level Conflict Analysis in Nepal, DFID restructured its staffing, programming and partnerships in order to work on conflict. There was a renewed emphasis on poor and marginalised groups. Offices were opened in conflict-affected areas and new partnerships were initiated with non-state actors (OECD, 2008a).

Through analysis of conflict and power relations, Oxfam changed its programming in the Horn of Africa to address the underlying causes of instability by ensuring a focus on rights, participation, equity and gender equality (Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001).

### **3.2.2 Review of the Tools and Approaches at Sector-level**

A recent UN (2010) report highlights that in fragile situations the public sector is often strongly tainted by association with the conflict in one form or another. This renders conflict analysis at the sector-level particularly important in order to ensure donor sectoral support is conflict-sensitive. This section analyses the literature and tools regarding conflict analysis and fragility for the education sector. Due to the nature of education provision and the ideological weight it wealds in relation to i.) the content of the curriculum, ii.) teaching and learning methodology, and iii.) education management at local levels, donors have focused particular attention on this sector.

Since the mid 2000s, various organisations have invested resources in analysing the dynamic relationship between fragility and education, and education and fragility, such as USAID (2006; Miller-Grandvaux, 2009), the International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO (2007; 2010), the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) (Barakat, Karpinska and Paulson, 2008; INEE 2010; INEE, 2011) and the EC (Ratcliffe and Perry, 2009). Although a substantial amount of literature has been generated over the past decade on education in fragile situations, there is still a dearth of analytical literature based on robust methodological approaches (Barakat et al., 2008). In this section, literature and tools developed by UNICEF, USAID, UNESCO and INEE will be reviewed.

In 2000, UNICEF published a seminal document on the potentially beneficial and destructive impacts of education in and on violent conflict thereby fostering a more critical analysis of the role of education in fragile situations (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). The study focuses on the ways in which educational structures and processes can politicise ethnically-based identities in such a way as to foment conflict. It identifies many of the issues discussed in macro-level conflict analysis tools such as the historical legacies, governance and economic trends. Appendix 11 is a summary of the positive and negative impacts which education can have in fragile situations.

The study, like broader political economy tools, highlights the importance of initiatives which take account of the deeper cultural context and which are not purely technical: “[there is a] need to go beyond solutions that are merely additive (add women and stir, add children and stir, add environment and stir) towards solutions that are transformative – solutions that change the underpinning logic and structures of behaviour” (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: 33). Unlike political economy approaches, however this statement recommends challenging the grain of human incentives and conduct. Nevertheless, the study does acknowledge the complexity of fragile situations and the need for multidimensional responses rather than purely technical solutions. The study concludes that good quality education, which contributes to peace, depends on local capacities rather than external ones and is a long-term process rather than a one off output. This is similar to political economy analysis

which seeks to identify and exploit opportunities rather than impose externally designed solutions.

Building on the 2000 UNICEF, Miller-Grandvaux identifies a series of issues which “constitute dangerous drivers of fragility and conflict” (2009: 8) making the education system liable to destructive influences. Nevertheless, these could again be perceived as assessing systems from a Western perspective, rather than taking local dynamics as the starting point and seeking to identify drivers of development from.

#### **Practices in the Education Sector which Drive Fragility and Conflict**

- Inequities in the distribution of education resources generate economic, ethnic or geographic favoritism and dominance;
- Teachers’ and administrative staff’s salaries, and other expenditures of public schools are paid for by financial contributions (or “school fees”) from parents on unofficial or semi official grounds;
- Academic grades and promotion from one grade to another grade are exchanged for sex cash and/or work;
- Flawed testing administration and lax accountability standards that allow exam questions to be sold in advance, grades to be changed for pay, and students from specific identity groups to fail;
- Teacher recruitment and postings are influenced by bribes or sexual favors, and teaching certificates and licenses obtained on false grounds via corrupt means;
- Children from certain communities are granted free admission while others are subjected to extra payments; and
- Education funds are misused at the national, regional or local levels and diverted to other official or non-official uses, including individual rent seeking (Miller-Grandvaux, 2009: 8).

In 2010, UNICEF commissioned a one-year research project on the role of education in peace-building as part of its Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition programme. The project seeks to generate evidence to fill the research gap in this area and to identify UNICEF’s added value. It is hoped that the study will provide rigorous evidence on country-level processes and challenges in rebuilding education systems in fragile situations within the context of long-term sustainable peace.

In 2006, USAID published an Education and Fragility Assessment Tool. Please refer to Appendix 12 for details. The Tool is a comprehensive framework which analyses the impact of the root causes of fragility against different areas of education. The framework acknowledges the importance of understanding the political economy of the fragility context: “The underlying principles that help define fragility include the quality of relationships between those with the power to govern and key actors and groups in society; the outcomes produced by those relationships; and the public’s perception of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state” (USAID, 2006: 2). This statement picks up on the DOC approach in relation to agents and institutions. The document also identifies the prevalence of elitism or cronyism in fragile situations, echoing the findings of macro-level political economy studies regarding the role of neo-patrimonialism. In addition, capacity challenges in fragile situations are analysed against the government’s ability to manage structural conditions, identified by DFID as structural features.

The USAID Tool is the only formal, institutional framework developed by a donor to analyse education in fragile situations drawing on conflict analysis approaches. Although the document makes reference to the political economy of the context, the questions to be posed in the tool itself are more influenced by traditional approaches to governance. Under the governance domain, for example, the tool discusses the impact of political will on children's access. Nevertheless, political economy analysis seeks to identify the key incentives and drivers of behaviour amongst different interest groups rather than making blanket statements regarding the existence or absence of political will. Moreover, owing to the fact that there are ten different domains to investigate, the tool may be over-ambitious. This may also make it difficult to identify entry points to mitigate fragility. The tool also analyses the education sector against a conflict and governance grid and therefore may fail to identify areas of resilience and drivers of change meriting support.

A 2009 assessment of youth fragility in Liberia draws on elements of the USAID Tool, however the approach taken in the assessment is quite different since it relies on perception-based data, canvassing the opinions of 600 youth. The report is more of a technical assessment of youth and their education, training and employment needs as well as their views on governance (Walker, Millar Wood and Allemanno, 2009). Nevertheless, it identifies the key drivers of fragility in relation to the different thematic domains set out in the USAID Tool. Moreover, the assessment is much broader than purely education since it also examines sustainable livelihoods, health and economic growth.

In 2007, UNESCO published a study focusing on attacks against students, teachers, academics, education trade unionists and education officials as well as on educational infrastructure (O'Malley, 2007). The study was conducted in response to the fact that the number of reported acts of aggression against educational personnel and buildings had risen dramatically. The study reinforces the findings of the UNICEF 2000 study: "A significant obstacle to preventing attacks may be that parties in conflicts often perceive that education is not neutral. For instance the provision of good quality education may be denied to particular groups, or it may appear that an alien culture, language or religion is being imposed on them" (O'Malley, 2007: 42). The study was the first of its kind and has led to the incorporation of security issues into traditional education programming (Miller-Grandvaux, 2009).

In 2009, the INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility commissioned a multi-country study on the relationship between education and fragility covering Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia and Liberia. The Working Group developed an *Analytical Framework of Education and Fragility* for the studies which can be found in Appendix 13. The Framework drew on the USAID Education and Fragility Assessment Tool, the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA FTI) Progressive Framework and other INEE tools. The interface between education and fragility was analysed across five fragility domains and against four areas of education.

The *Analytical Framework* is complex and extremely detailed, perhaps due to the fact that it represents an amalgamation of many different institutional approaches to fragility. The synthesis report of the four country reports found that weaknesses with the Analytical Framework led to problems for the country-level research since the researchers interpreted the framework differently (INEE, 2011). Nevertheless, some overall trends emerged from the countries. The country studies revealed that “education actively or deliberately reinforces and perpetuates fragility for example through the politicisation and manipulation of access, structures, curricula, and textbooks. [Education also] reflects the status quo, for example by reproducing and failing to challenge existent patterns of division, inequality, violence, corruption, and inefficiency” (INEE, 2011: 14).

The recent report by INEE (2010) on *The Multiple Faces of Education* represents an important contribution to the existing literature by synthesising key findings. It updates the 2000 UNICEF study and brings to bear the latest thinking regarding fragility on the education sector. It aims to analyse the impact of conflict and fragility on education and vice versa. Importantly, the paper acknowledges the political economy dimension of education delivery in fragile situations: “education’s potential to either mitigate or exacerbate conflict and fragility will be a result of nuanced interfaces between education policies, planning and programming and the drivers and dynamics of conflict and fragility” (INEE, 2010: 4). Nevertheless, a political economy approach is not infused throughout the analysis of the report and there is a stronger focus on the relationship between conflict and education than the political economy of education. It acknowledges the need to focus on the “who, what, and why” of education service delivery but fails to shed light on these questions, perhaps due to a lack of data.

The study includes a helpful summary of the challenges for education provision stemming from conflict and fragility. The report includes various recommendations, one of which is for education to be recognised not purely in service delivery terms, but also in relation to its role in stabilisation, state-building and fostering more resilient communities as well as a potential source of fragility (INEE, 2010).

## **4. Conclusions and Implications**

Section 3 has reviewed the tools and literature related to political economy and conflict analysis at country and sector-levels (and issue-level for political economy), comparing and contrasting approaches. Although approaches to political economy and conflict analysis have influenced donor planning cycles for a decade, formal reviews of the effectiveness of the various tools are scarce. This lack of documentation makes analysing and comparing the tools more challenging.

The review of the literature and tools has revealed that frameworks which incorporate political economy *and* conflict analysis approaches into assessments of the education sector, or into assessments of particular issues within the education sector, are lacking. It is clear that donor approaches to political economy and conflict analysis respectively are better developed at macro-levels. There are fewer tools and frameworks available on political economy analysis at the sector-level and of those which do exist, none is specifically adapted for the social sectors. Having said this, the past decade has seen a substantial generation of literature and frameworks related to education and fragility. Due to the difficulty of measuring fragility, these tools have generally focused on indicators related to conflict, security and governance. They have given greater prominence to the impact of the conflict on

education provision or accessibility and to the sources of grievances related to education which may have stoked the conflict, rather than also infused with political economy approaches, identifying the key drivers of positive and negative change. The tools have also tended to revert to more traditional approaches to governance assessments.

As a result, there is a need for new approaches to be developed which bring together these different disciplines in order to foster a deeper understand of the multifaceted dynamics of the conflict on the education sector and particular issues within the sector through a political economy framework. Indeed, “education interventions to mitigate fragility and promote stability require a different understanding of the characteristics of each potential or real conflict and thus new assessments and operational guidance methodologies” (Miller-Grandvaux, 2009: 12.) This would allow for example a more nuanced understanding of the scope and nature of exclusion from school and learning and would lead to more appropriate donor responses, rather than reverting to simplistic models of support which focus either purely on supply or demand. Merging approaches to conflict and political economy analysis in the education sector may also lead to a more honest debate within donor agencies regarding the damage which the existing models of education delivery can have on state-building and peace-building, as indicated by recent research (INEE, 2011) and the identification of drivers of change and resilience deserving donor support.

The importance of conducting a political economy and conflict analysis prior to designing donor support cannot be underestimated due to the fact that agencies often use the education sector as an entry point to address broader political and governance challenges (EC, 2008; Miller-Grandvaux, 2009; INEE 2010).

#### **4.1 Implications for Phase 2**

In light of the review of the literature and tools above, it is suggested that the following questions should be posed prior to the design of the in-country research during the second phase of the EC *Project on Guidance on Political Economy Analysis in the Education Sector in Fragile Situations*. The answers to the questions will help to inform the scope and approach of the research.

### Questions to Inform the Design of Country-level Analytical Work

- What is the intended use and objective of the research?
- Will the research focus on:
  - Analysis of country-level context for sector reform;
  - Analysis of sector characteristics, performance and challenges;
  - Analysis of the policy content, consequences and political viability of proposed policies or policy changes;
  - Analysis of the domestic policy-making and implementation process;
  - Analysis of the key actors, interests and relationships between these actors; or
  - Policy management and operational implications: assessment of possible entry points for donor support to sector reforms?
- What is the status of the EU planning cycle?
- Can the outcomes of the analytical work feed into programming and funding decisions? (If not, can the research be used for other purposes?)
- What are the timeframes for the above?
- What will be the composition of the team in relation to international and national expertise?
- Who will commission the research? Will it be EU-driven or involve collaboration with other development partners and the government?
- Is it likely that the results will be confidential or shared with a closed group of recipients?
- What is the EU's level of influence in the country?
- Given the level of fragility of the country, should the approach taken be more influenced by political economy analysis or conflict analysis? (What should be the 'base' tool)?

Once the objective, scope and approach to be employed have been clarified, it will be possible to identify which tool or which combination of tools to employ in phase 2. In light of the findings of this literature review and the gaps identified above, it would be advisable to use a combination of tools in phase 2. It is suggested that DOC should be used to frame the overarching research of the macro-level context. In order to ensure that the legacy and dynamics of the conflict are understood, it is suggested that elements of USAID's ICAF should be used during the analysis, namely i.) evaluating the context of the conflict; ii.) understanding the core grievances and social / institutional resilience; iii.) identifying drivers of conflict and mitigating factors; and iv.) describing opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict (see Figure 11 in Appendix 10). Where country-level political economy or conflict assessments have already been conducted, these will be obviously reviewed. Existing country studies may also help to identify specific entry points for political economy analysis in the education sector.

Depending on the design of the in-country research, it may be appropriate to use various tools from the ODI *Analytical Framework for Understanding the Political Economy of Sectors and Policy Arenas*, such as the Figures 3 and 4, the *Intra-sector Analysis of Organisations in a Sector* and *How Players Influence the Policy-making Process: Basic Issues for Analysis* in Appendix 4. If the EC sector-level guidance related to political economy analysis is ready and considered to be relevant for fragile situations, this could also be used for the implementation phase.

It could also be argued that there is a need for a single approach which brings together simplified tools with the same theoretical underpinning that allows analysis to be undertaken across the three levels: i.) macro political economy drivers at country level; ii.) sector analysis; and iii.) analysis of implementation problems in relation to particular policies. This might carry the promise of bridging between more abstract analysis at macro level and the practical challenges at the level of implementation.

Where there are particular issues or problems of common concern, EU Delegations may also wish to explore the option of designing joint analyses in partnership with other development partners such as USAID, UNICEF, UNESCO, DFID and the World Bank. Where the situation allows, the EU can also investigate the possibility of collaborating with the government.

## References

- ADE. 2010. Thematic Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building. Final Report for the Concept Study.
- Barakat, B.; Karpinska, Z.; Paulson, J. 2008. *Desk Study: Education and Fragility*. Conflict and Education Research Group.
- Booth, D. 2011. "Aid, Institutions and Governance: What Have We Learned?" In: *Development Policy Review*, 29, S1, pp. S5-S26.
- Booth, D.; Golooba-Mutebi, F. 2009. *Aiding Economic Growth in Africa: The Political Economy of Roads Reform in Uganda*. London: ODI.
- Booth, D.; Crook, R.; Gyimah-Boadi, E.; Killick, T.; Luckham, R.; Boateng, N. 2005. *What are the Drivers of Change in Ghana?* CDD/ODI Policy Brief No. 1, November 2005.
- Bossuyt, J.; Vanheukelom, J.; Aggad, F.; Herrero-Cangas, A.; Keijzer, N.; 2009. *Supporting Domestic Accountability: Exploring Conceptual Dimensions and Operational Challenges*. Maastricht: The European Centre for Development Policy Management.
- Bush, K. 1998. *A Measure of Peace: Peace And Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects In Conflict Zones*. Working Paper No.1. International Development Research Centre, Canada.
- Bush, K. D.; Saltarelli, D.; eds. 2000. *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children*. Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre.
- Center for Conflict Resolution; Rwenzori Development and Research Centre; Saferworld; Youth Development Organisation Arua. 2008. *Water and Conflict: Making Water Delivery Conflict-sensitive in Uganda*. London: Saferworld.
- Clingendael Institute. 2005. *The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development*. The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Collier, P. 2009. *Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: HarperCollins.
- DFID. 2002. *Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes*. London: DFID.
- DFID. 2004. *Drivers of Change Public Information Note*.
- DFID. 2005. *Using Drivers of Change to Improve Aid Effectiveness*. A DFID Practice Paper.
- DFID. 2007. *Country Governance Analysis*. How To Note. A DFID Practice Paper.
- DFID. 2009a. *Political Economy Analysis*. How To Note. A DFID Practice Paper.

- DFID. 2009b. *Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future*. London: DFID.
- DFID. 2010. *Building Peaceful States and Societies*. A DFID Practice Paper. London: DFID.
- EC. 2001. *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*.
- EC. 2003. *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee: Governance and Development*.
- EC. 2005. *Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development: Why, What and How?* Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC. 2007. *Support to Sector Programmes Covering the Three Financing Modalities: Sector Budget Support, Pool Funding and EC Project Procedures*.
- EC. 2008a. *Analysing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC. 2008b. *European Commission Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict*.
- EC. 2009a. *Toolkit for Capacity Development*. Reference Document N. 6. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC. 2009b. *Making Technical Cooperation More Effective*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EC. 2009c. *Public Sector Reform: An Introduction*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- Edelmann, D. 2009. *Analysing and Managing the Political Dynamics of Sector Reforms: A Source Book on Sector-level Political Economy Approaches*. London: ODI.
- EFA FTI. 2008. *FTI Support to Fragile Situations: Progressive Framework. Discussion Document and Guidelines*.
- Fischer, M. et al. 2004. *The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin: The Berghof Institute.
- Fritz, V.; Kaiser, K.; Levy, B. 2009. *Problem-driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis: Good Practice Framework*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- Gaigals, C.; Leonhardt, M. 2001. *Conflict-sensitive Approaches to Development: A Review of Practice*. Saferworld, International Alert, International Development Research Centre Report.
- Hazenberg, J. 2009. *The SGACA Experience: Incentives, Interests and Raw Power*.
- Heymans, C.; Pycroft, C. 2003. *Drivers of Change in Nigeria: A Preliminary Overview*.
- Grindle, M. S. 2005. *Good Enough Governance Revisited*.

Grindle, M. S. 2011. "Good Enough Governance Revisited" In: *Development Policy Review*, 29, S9, pp. S199-S221.

IDS. 2010. *An Upside Down View of Governance*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

INEE. 2010. *The Multiple Faces of Education in Conflict-affected and Fragile Contexts*.

INEE. 2011. *Understanding Education's Role in Fragility; Synthesis of Four Situational Analyses of Education and Fragility: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Liberia*. Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning.

Miller-Grandvaux, Y. 2009. "Education and Fragility: A New Framework." In *Journal of Education for International Development* 4:1 (2009). Washington, D.C.: USAID.

Moncrieffe, J.; Luttrell, C. 2005. *An Analytical Framework for Understanding the Political Economy of Sectors and Policy Arenas*.

Jones, S. 2010. *Lessons from Political Economy Analysis in Nepal*.

Leftwich, A. 2006. *From Drivers of Change to the Politics of Development: Refining the Analytical Framework to Understand the Politics of the Places Where we Work*.

Odugbemi, S.; Jacobson, T.; eds. 2008. *Governance Reform Under Real World Conditions: Citizens, Stakeholders and Voice*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

OECD DAC. 1997. *Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*.

OECD DAC. 2007. *Principles of Good Practice in International Engagement in Fragile States*.

OECD. 2008a. *Survey of Donor Approaches to Governance Assessment*. Paris: OECD.

OECD. 2008b. *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*.

OECD. 2010. *Making Reform Happen: Lessons from OECD Countries*. Paris: OECD.

O'Malley, B. 2007. *Education Under Attack*. Paris: UNESCO.

O'Malley, B. 2010. *Education Under Attack*. Paris: UNESCO.

Ratcliffe, M.; Perry, C. 2009. *Study on Governance Challenges for Education in Fragile Situations: Study Synthesis Report*.

Rampa, F. 2010. *Applying the EC's Governance Analysis Framework to the Water Sector in Kenya*.

SIDA. 2006. *Power Analysis: Experiences and Challenges*. Stockholm: SIDA.

Smith, A. 2003. *Education, Conflict and International Development*. London: DFID.

United Nations. 2010. *Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned; World Public Sector Report 2010*. New York: United Nations.

Unsworth, S. Conflict Research Unit. 2007. *Framework for Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis: Designing Strategic Responses Towards Good Governance*. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.

USAID. 2006. *Education and Fragility: An Assessment Tool*. Washington, D.C.: USAID

US Government. 2008. *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework*. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State.

Utomi, P.; Duncan, A.; Williams, G. 2007. *Nigeria: The Political Economy of Reform Strengthening the Incentives for Economic Growth*. Brighton: The Policy Practice.

Vaux, T.; Bewa, A.; Sampson, P. 2007. *Aid and Conflict In the Democratic Republic of Congo: Strategic Conflict Assessment*.

Vaux, T; Smith, A; Subba, S. 2006. *EFA in Nepal from a Conflict Perspective*. London: International Alert.

Vines, A.; Shaxson, N.; Rimli, L.; Heymans, C. 2005. *Angola Drivers of Change: An Overview*. London: Chatham House.

Walker, G.; Millar Wood, J.C.; Allemano, E. 2009. *Liberia Youth Fragility Assessment*. Washington, D.C.: USAID.

Warrener, D. 2004. *The Drivers of Change Approach*. Synthesis Paper 3. London: ODI.

Weingast, B. R.; Wittman, D. A. (Eds). 2006. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

World Bank. 2008. *The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Issues and Implications for Policy Dialogue and Development Operations*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.